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NOTHING NEW IN THE (NORTH) EAST? INTERPRETING THE 
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF JAPANESE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
Abstract: Japan finally seems to be pulling itself out of its “lost 
decade” (and a half) of economic stagnation. Some grudgingly or 
triumphantly attribute this to micro-economic reforms, freeing up 
arthritic markets, although there is also evidence that macro-
economic policy failures have been a major cause of poor 
performance since the 1990s. Many point to overlapping 
transformations in corporate governance, broadly defined to cover 
relationships among managers and employees as well as between 
firms and outside shareholders, creditors, and other stakeholders. 
These relationships are in flux, with moves arguably favouring 
shareholders and more market-driven control mechanisms. 
It has certainly been a “found decade” for law reform in Japan, 
particularly in corporate law, with a plethora of legislative 
amendments commencing around 1993 and culminating in the 
enactment of a consolidated “Company Law” in 2005. This 
“modernisation” project, particularly since 2001, is reportedly 
aimed at (i) securing better corporate governance; (ii) bringing the 
law into line with a highly-developed information society; (iii) 
liberalising fundraising measures; (iv) bringing corporate law into 
line with the internationalization of corporate activity; and (v) 
modernizing terms and consolidating corporate law. Because the 
suite of revisions has moved away from strict mandatory rules set 
out originally in Japan’s Commercial Code of 1899, modeled 
primarily on German law, another growing perception is that 
Japanese corporate law and practice is or will soon be converging 




However, assessments remain divided as to whether these moves 
in corporate governance and capitalism more generally in Japan 
amount to a new paradigm or “regime shift”. Focusing primarily 
on quite influential commentary in English, Part I of this paper 
outlines two pairs of views. It concludes that the most plausible 
assessment is of significant but “gradual transformation” towards 
a more market-driven approach, evident also in other advanced 
political economies. 
Drawing more generally from these often virulently divided views, 
Part II sets out five ways forward through the proliferating 
literature and source material on corporate governance in Japan. 
Particular care must be taken in: (i) selecting the temporal 
timeframe, (ii) selecting countries to compare, (iii) balancing black-
letter law and broader socio-economic context, (iv) reflecting on 
and disclosing normative preferences, and (v) giving weight to 
processes as well as outcomes, when assessing change in Japan – 
and any other country’s governance system. 
Part III ends with a call for further research particularly on law- 
and policy-producing processes, rather than mainly outcomes. It 
also outlines the usefulness of this analytical framework for 
analysing the broader field of Corporate Social Responsibility, now 
emerging as the next major area of debate and transformation in 
Japan - as elsewhere. 
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NOTHING NEW IN THE (NORTH) EAST? INTERPRETING THE 
RHETORIC AND REALITY OF JAPANESE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE* 
Dr Luke Nottage# 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Japan has recently reappeared on the radar screen of comparative 
corporate governance debates, including in the writings of 
commentators in Australia. Two main reasons can be imagined for 
this renewed interest. One is contemporary concern about the 
perceived excesses of the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance, focused on maximizing shareholder value, in the 
wake of widespread corporate collapses in the US and Australia. 
Japan has regained attention as promising a broader-based 
“stakeholder” model, giving weight also to the interests of core 
employees, creditors (especially the so-called “main banks”), key 
suppliers and customers (especially those in keiretsu corporate 
groups) {Acquaah-Gaisie 2005: 43}. Indeed, with the Australia-US 
Free Trade Agreement recently entering in force, fears of further 
excessive “Americanisation of Australian corporate law” (cf {von 
                                            
* Paper for the Corporate Law Teachers Association conference, University of 
Queensland, 6-7 February 2006. The skeleton of this paper was presented at the 
inaugural International CLPE Conference, “The Corporate Governance Matrix: 
Unfolding the New Agenda”, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, 20-21 October 
2005. Flesh was added to the bones at a seminar at the Centre for at the 
University of Wollongong, on 9 November 2005. I am grateful to the organizers 
and participants at these events, for the research assistance from Hitoshi Nasu, 
and for the support of the Australian Research Council (Discovery Grant 
A1753). 
# Senior Lecturer, University of Sydney Faculty of Law; Co-Director, Australian 
Network for Japanese Law; luken@law.usyd.edu.au.  
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Nessen 1999}) have led to calls for Australia to contest 
convergence by drawing on stakeholder models reportedly more 
prevalent in our region, notably in Japan {Clarke 2005: 118-29}. 
This possibility is reinforced by the potential for a full-scale FTA 
between Australia and Japan, leveraging off the looser Australia-
Japan Trade and Economic Framework agreed upon in 2003.1 A 
second reason for greater interest recently in Japanese corporate 
governance is that its vast economy – still many times larger than 
China’s, for example – seems finally to be pulling itself out of its 
“lost decade” (and a half) of economic stagnation. Indeed, the 
author of “Japan: The System that Soured” {Katz 1998} now argues 
that it will stun the world in its economic renaissance, albeit 
probably not for another decade – following a “tumultuous battle” 
at the political level {Katz 2003: 10}. 
However, some grudgingly or triumphantly attribute incipient 
economic revival precisely to Japan’s micro-economic reforms in 
freeing up arthritic markets {The Economist, 2005 #190}, although 
there is also good evidence that macro-economic policy failures 
were a major cause of poor economic performance since the 1990s 
{Lincoln 2003}. Relatedly, many highlight overlapping 
transformations in corporate governance towards greater primacy 
being accorded to shareholders and equity markets, noting for 
example declines in stable and cross-shareholdings, rapid growth 
in foreign shareholders, and more activism from Japanese 
institutional shareholders. In addition, it has certainly been a 
“found decade” for law reform in Japan, particularly in corporate 
law. A plethora of statutory amendments has been enacted, 
outlined in Appendix A2, commencing around 1993 and 
                                            
1 Both countries embarked in April 2005 on a formal feasibility study into a 
comprehensive FTA: see <http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/fta/index.html>. 
2 Details of many of these changes are provided in {Nottage 2001}, updated and 
developed in {Nottage and Wolff 2005} (both now available via www.ssrn.com), 
and given a more practical focus in {Nottage and Wolff 2000-5}. This paper also 
generally limits its literature references to works not cited in the former two 
publications, or in {Nottage 2005b}. There has been relatively fewer changes to 
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culminating in the enactment of a consolidated “Companies Act” 
in 2005. The aims of this “modernisation” project, particularly 
over 2001-5, have been described as (i) securing better corporate 
governance; (ii) bringing the law into line with a highly-developed 
information society; (iii) liberalising fundraising measures; (iv) 
bringing corporate law into line with the internationalization of 
corporate activity; and (v) modernizing terms and consolidating 
corporate law {Takahashi and Shimizu 2005: 36}. More generally, 
the reforms since 1993 include “substantial changes in board 
governance and incentive structures, major developments in the 
areas of directorial duties and personal liability, and expansions of 
organizational flexibility”. This has been accompanied by Japanese 
corporate law norms with distinct parallels to Delaware law, 
especially regarding the use of defensive measures like “poison 
pills” in Japan’s brave new world of occasional hostile takeovers 
{Milhaupt 2005a: 2175}. Because this package of reforms has 
relaxed many mandatory rules set out in Japan’s Commercial 
Code, originally enacted in 1899 based primarily on German law 
{Baum and Takahashi 2005}, another growing perception is that 
Japanese corporate law and practice is or will soon be converging 
strongly on the US model {cf Nottage and Wolff 2005}. 
Nonetheless, assessments remain divided as to whether these 
moves in corporate governance and capitalism more generally in 
Japan amount to a new paradigm or “regime shift” {Pempel 1998}. 
Part I of this paper introduces and critically assesses often 
influential commentary primarily in English on contemporary 
Japanese developments.3 It identifies two pairs of views, stressing 
                                                                                                                
securities regulation in Japan, but those have also been considerable {Kelemen 
and Sibbitt 2002}.  
3 This paper only touches on the literature in Japanese. One reason is that it is 
even vaster. It is also less likely to be accessible to most readers, and hence in 
need of an interpretive framework like that proposed here for the literature in 
English. In addition, the “world” of writings in Japanese, particularly in 
academic circles and even in the relatively new field of corporate governance, 
tends to focus somewhat more on black-letter law than how that is embedded 
in socio-economic context. This disjunction, also somewhat evident also in the 
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respectively continuity and change, and argues that the perception 
of significant but “gradual transformation” – common also in 
other advanced political economies {Streeck and Thelen eds 2005} 
– is most plausible. This conclusion requires those who invoke 
Japan as still exemplifying a strong stakeholder model to concede 
that it continues to morph towards a more Anglo-American 
model; but it also identifies a resilient alternative to the latter, and 
thus contradicts “strong convergence” theorists (see also generally 
{Hill 2005}, reviewing {Gordon and Roe eds 2004}). More generally, 
Part II sets out five ways forward through the burgeoning literature 
and source material on corporate governance in Japan.4 When 
assessing change versus continuity, great care must be taken in: (i) 
selecting timeframes, (ii) selecting countries to compare, (iii) 
balancing black-letter law and broader socio-economic context, (iv) 
reflecting on and disclosing normative preferences, and (v) giving 
weight to processes as well as outcomes. These lessons can also be 
extended to broader comparative corporate governance research, 
which may be settling into somewhat of a rut (cf generally {Denis 
and McConnell 2005}; {Pinto 2005}). Part III of the paper reviews 
these conclusions and ends with a call for further research 
particularly on law- and policy-producing processes, rather than 
just outcomes. It also sketches how such lessons may be useful in 
comparing Japanese developments in the overlapping but even 
broader field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Overall, 
therefore, this paper aims both to offer a roadmap through the 
burgeoning literature on corporate governance and capitalism 
more generally in Japan; but also to engage with and contribute to 
ongoing theory-building in broader comparative studies in these 
fields, emerging from a variety of disciplines – particularly law, 
economics, politics, and sociology. 
                                                                                                                
literature in German (see eg {Dernauer 2005}), may lead to somewhat different 
assessments of continuity versus change ({Ginsburg et al 2001}), as suggested in 
Part II(iii) below. 
4 A rich data source on unfolding events in Japan is the monthly e-mail bulletin 
freely available via 
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/anjel/content/anjel_research_guide.htm. 
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I. CHANGE IN JAPANESE SOCIETY, LAW AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TWO TIMES TWO 
VIEWS 
The first set of views shares a perception of no or minimal change 
in Japan, but each view differs on the immutable nature of its 
socio-economic ordering and legal system. The second set, by 
contrast, acknowledges significant change; but one view argues 
that a radical shift is evident or underway, whereas another 
perceives a more gradual transformation. 
(I) NO OR MINIMAL CHANGE: (A) STILL COMMUNITARIAN 
SOCIETY & STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE 
At one extreme, John Haley {2005a; 2005b} insists that nothing is 
new in the (North) East, in that the corporate sector – like the 
public sector5 – continues to give primacy to entry-level hiring 
coupled with a central personnel office staffed by senior career 
managers charged with recruitment, training, assignment and 
promotion of career staff. In his view, this underpins a broader 
stakeholder approach to corporate governance, and fits with 
Japan’s ongoing communitarian approach to law and society 
{Haley 1998}.  
Ronald {Dore 2000} has become more circumspect, conceding that 
“employee sovereignty has shifted markedly towards shareholder 
sovereignty”, and identifying as another related pressure point 
“the development of a market for corporate control” {Dore 2005: 
443}. But he too emphasizes that employment institutions 
                                            
5 Cf eg {Amyx 2004}, noting mid-career hires of specialists into the Financial 
Supervisory Agency set up in 1998 (“FSA”, expanded into the Financial Services 
Agency in 2000), as the centerpiece of a novel regime for financial markets 
regulation following turmoil in financial markets particularly from late 1997; 
and of mid-career transfers and hires of specialists into the Cabinet Office, 
increasingly powerful since its inauguration in 2001. 
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affecting the careers of top managers, in particular, have still 
changed little in Japan, even compared to Germany. This helps to 
insulate Japan’s traditional means of motivating both honest and 
dynamic corporate managers, despite the fading ideology 
encouraging trust-based relationships that had more directly 
underpinned such institutions.6  
Sanford {Jacoby 2005: 11-12}, similarly drawing primarily on 
empirical research from around 2001, also concludes that a core 
aspect of corporate governance has not changed much since 
around 1980, at least for listed companies and compared to the US. 
He argues that Japanese companies remain relatively organization-
oriented, focused on long-term employees and broader 
stakeholders in their corporate governance, underscored by a high-
status centralised Human Relations (HR) department. Compared 
to Haley (who implies that the distribution of Japanese firms in 
2004, “Japan 2004” in Figure 1 below, remains virtually identical 
to that in 1980), Jacoby concedes some shifts toward more market-
oriented firms, with HR executives losing some influence. 
However, he views the US as having moved even more strongly 
towards that extreme (from “US 1980” to “US 2004”) over the last 
two decades. 
Figure 1 (adapted from {Jacoby 2005: 158}) 
 
                                            
6 Thus, the neo-communitarian hermeneutical approach to Japanese law and 
society presented by {Tanase, 2005; forthcoming} has rather more in common 
with Dore. 
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Although Jacoby’s study purports to be about “corporate 
governance”, he focuses overwhelmingly on “employment 
relations”. Admittedly, especially in the Japanese context, the 
relations between managers and employees are very important for 
the governance of firms. But so too are other relations that he 
hardly touches on, particularly between the firms and their 
creditors or suppliers. Nonetheless, Figure 1 can be thought also as 
illustrating only a limited shift in Japan (“x”) away from a broader 
stakeholder-based approach to corporate governance overall and 
towards a more shareholder-based approach, which moreover has 
gained even more traction in the US over the last quarter century 
(“x + •”). 
(I) NO CHANGE: (B) ACTUALLY RATIONALLY SELF-INTERESTED, 
HENCE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
In partial contrast, Mark Ramseyer agrees that little has really 
changed in Japan, but only because everyone else has 
fundamentally misconstrued the true nature of its law and society. 
Rather than a communitarian orientation and broader stakeholder 
primacy, he asserts, the Japanese have always been driven by 
narrow (mostly financial) rational self-interest {Ramseyer and 
Nakazoto 1999}. This is reflected in more indirect but significant 
returns to shareholders even during the high-growth era after 
World War II, when “lifelong employment” practices spread 
among larger Japanese companies {Kaplan and Ramseyer 1996}. On 
this view, observed shifts towards greater shareholder primacy in 
recent years are merely a move “back to the future” of corporate 
law in Japan ({Miwa and Ramseyer 2005a}; cf also {Okazaki 2004}). 
Consistently, moreover, he and his main co-author insist that the 
“main banks” commonly perceived as having emerged as another 
substitute monitor of managerial performance were a figment of 
the (mainly Marxist) imagination {Miwa & Ramseyer 2005b}. 
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Thus, reports of their steady demise recently are wrong; they never 
existed.7 Ramseyer has not (yet) been bold enough to say that 
lifelong employment is also a pure fiction, but presumably he 
would decry this as a practice forced upon managers by a 
misguided legal system. 
To visualize this understanding, think again of Figure 1 above as 
more generally depicting a spectrum of stakeholder versus 
shareholder corporate governance, as well as organization- versus 
market-oriented HR practices. Then, for Ramseyer, the two bell 
curves in Figure 1 above representing the distribution of Japanese 
firms in 1980 and 2004 (“Japan 1980” and “Japan 2004”) may 
simply vanish, becoming their US counterparts (“US 1980” and 
“US 2004”)! Alternatively, at least, the curves need to be redrawn 
similarly towards the market end of the spectrum. 
(II) CHANGE: (A) DRAMATIC SHIFTS TOWARDS MARKET 
SOLUTIONS AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
A major contrast lies with those who instead perceive significant 
shifts occurring in Japan, away from a stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance giving primacy especially to core employees 
and instead giving primacy to shareholder interests. Again there 
                                            
7 Cf eg {Milhaupt 2002}, summarised in {Nottage 2005b} with other literature 
contrary to Ramseyer’s assertions. For more empirical evidence of the post-War 
importance of main banks, see also eg {Amyx 2004} (demonstrating their 
compatibility with informal regulation by the Ministry of Finance until the 
establishment of the FSA in 1998: agreeing on the latter, see also {Cerny 2005}); 
and especially {Gerlach and Lincoln 2004} (using qualitative and quantitative 
analysis in chapter 3, and regression analysis in chapter 4, to demonstrate the 
partial persistence of main bank-centred “horizontal keiretsu”, as well as 
manufacturing or distribution “vertical keiretsu”). For a sociological (rather 
than political science or economic) theory of Japan’s banking networks, 
including an explanation for institutional and structural properties leading to 
superior bank performance when the economy was growing but poor 
performance as it has declined, see the social exchange model in {Wan et al 
2005}. 
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are two variants. One view emphasises dramatic change, 
epitomized by the editor of The Economist in a recent comment 
on the appointment of a Welshman to head Sony, but also shared 
by many writers in the (especially Western) financial press:8 
“Think of all the features that, 10, 15 or 20 years ago, 
were considered axiomatic about big Japanese 
companies. They had extensive cross-shareholdings 
with other firms, especially suppliers and banks. They 
used the promise of lifetime employment to keep their 
labor force loyal, paying according to age and seniority. 
They had strangely large corporate boards, stuffed with 
grandees and retired executives. They worried about 
sales and market share, not profits. Their top 
executives all came from within, and behaved more 
like bureaucrats taking their turn in the top seats for a 
few years than like corporate chieftains. The idea of 
foreigners on the board, let alone in senior 
management, was anathema. 
Such generalizations were always a bit overdone, but 
not by much. Now, you can cross out every single one 
of them. Cross-shareholdings have largely been 
unwound. Lifetime employment, even in big firms, is 
now the exception not the rule thanks to changes in 
labor laws that have allowed workers to be employed 
on short-term contracts. Such employees make up 
40% or more of the total at manufacturers such as 
Toyota. Many -- though not all -- corporate boards 
have been streamlined, with more independent 
directors and fewer placemen. The profitability of big 
Japanese firms has risen to record levels (when 
measured as a ratio to sales), thanks to restructuring, 
                                            
8 {Emmott 2005}. See also {Dawson and Tashiro 2005}. Emphasising the decline 
of cross-shareholding since the late 1990s, but hardly its complete “unwinding”, 
see also {Okabe 2002}. 
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the aforementioned labor-force changes, and efforts to 
fatten margins. Falling wages leave Japan's domestic 
economy still suffering from deflation and weak 
demand, but do wonders for corporate profits. 
Executives remain primarily bureaucratic but there are 
now many more exceptions, sounding and behaving 
more like American CEOs and with senior 
management pay geared to performance. And foreign 
executives are no longer unacceptable.” 
Likewise, The Economist saw the victory of the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) in the snap election it called on 
(symbolically) 11 September 2005, to renew overwhelmingly its 
mandate for deregulation of the postal savings system, as an 
important further step towards restoring Japan as “a normal 
advanced economy”, as well as an indicator of “just how much the 
electorate has changed, and matured, over the course of Japan's 
dismal decade”.9 
Similar views, of Japan and its corporate world well on the road to 
Americanisation, are also popular among other writers in the 
financial press.10 Again, it may be helpful to conceptualise such 
conclusions in terms of Figure 1. Even in employment relations, 
for example, The Economist would perceive a sharper shift by 
Japan towards the market end of the spectrum in recent years. 
Broadening the scope of corporate governance to encompass other 
relationships such as those between firms and their financial 
institutions, more clearly reconfigured after financial markets 
                                            
9 {Economist, 2005 #139}. But see the Leader in the same issue, concluding that 
the LDP’s moderate reformism belies “a new Japan”: {Economist, 2005 #139}. 
10 See also eg {Tett 2004}. Apart from the obvious point that proclaiming 
“change” will tend to sell more copy than “continuity”, this tendency in the 
financial press may be linked to broader shifts in the media world that have 
underpinned perceptions of crises and hence hence widespread changes in both 
government regulation and tort litigation in countries like the US {Haltom and 
McCann 2004}. 
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crises and deregulation in the late 1990s, The Economist would 
argue for an even sharper shift towards more shareholder-driven 
corporate governance in Japan. 
(II) CHANGE: (B) SIGNIFICANT SHIFTS AWAY FROM THE 
STAKEHOLDER MODEL 
The second variant of the perspective acknowledging more change, 
well underway in Japanese corporate governance and society, is 
more guarded. My own analyses so far have acknowledged a 
significant realignment of stakeholders, with shareholders winning 
out clearly over creditors,11 but less so vis-à-vis employees 
(despite much more change underway than acknowledged by 
Haley12), and perhaps even less so in some areas of industrial 
organization (especially in relations with key suppliers) and 
relations between firms and regulators or the broader community 
(such as NGOs): 
                                            
11 For further instances of growing shareholder influence, not otherwise cited in 
this presentation, see eg {, 2005 #12}, {Hutton, 2005 #62}, {Jopson, 2004 #86}, 
{Sanchanta, 2005 #74;Sapsford, 2005 #77}. 
12 Particularly on core incumbents in larger firms, see also {Jacoby, 2005 
#95;Jacoby, 2005 #73;Jacoby, 2005 #72} and (albeit generally with less change 
compared even to Germany) {Jackson 2005; Jackson and Moerke 2005}. But the 
proportion of non-regular employees has been rising disturbingly, from 20 to 30 
percent over the last decade, despite rising unemployment and recession, and 
Japan faces the broader challenge of a rapidly graying population {Seike 2005}. 
The country also has an ever-increasing “lost generation” of young people who 
cannot and/or do not want to participate in the regular workforce based on the 
model extolled by Haley: see {Mathews, 2004 #167}, {Saito, 2005 #21} and 
{Kondo, 2005 #20}. 
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Figure 2 (from {Nottage & Wolff 2005}) 
 
Relative stasis in the latter dimensions represents more than 
institutional inertia, and a multi-layered outcome {Sarra and 
Nakahigashi 2002} that poses problems for overly monolithic 
views of divergent “varieties of capitalism” ({Nottage 2001; cf 
{Hall & Soskice 2001} and {Goodin 2003}}. It also means the 
continued existence of a competing ideological model for (re-
)organizing corporate governance, allowing more trust-building 
“learning by monitoring” that may yet resonate in areas such as 
shareholder relations where the emerging ideology instead mostly 
assumes a “trust-defying” homo economicus.13 
                                            
13 Cf eg {Learmount 2002}, contrasting “economic” theories of the firm 
assuming strongly self-interested human behaviour and “organizational” 
theories allowing for more other-oriented behaviour; but concluding from 
detailed qualitative studies that corporate governance relationships for Japanese 
2006] NOTHING NEW IN THE (NORTH) EAST? 13 
 
Likewise, {Lincoln and Gerlach 2004: 373} confirm that a new 
economy is emerging in Japan, differing from the old in significant 
ways. In their network analysis terms: 
“it is characterized by weaker, less concatenated, less 
expansive, less multiplex and less embedded ties; more 
fleeting fragmented, asymmetric and numerous ties. 
The proposed reforms in Japanese corporate boards 
illustrate [as enacted in 2002 and in force since 2003 
(see Appendix A), discussed below in relation to 
{Gilson and Milhaupt 2005}]. A board with a larger 
percentage of bona fide outsiders means more links 
between the firm and its environment but, absent the 
power of keiretsu to mold them, such ties will be less 
overlapping, interwoven and otherwise ordered than in 
the past. Although our data [primarily from the 1960s 
through to the 1990s] show it proceeding in fits and 
starts depending on the period and the group, the slow 
and uneven dissolution of the keiretsu is an 
inescapable macro-trend. In their stead is materializing 
a looser, more flexibly structured amalgam of micro-
network pairings and clusterings pegged closely to the 
strategic business goals of individual firms. However, 
much of the basis for the networks of the past persists: 
                                                                                                                
firms overall – not just relationships with employees or senior managers, and 
even while changing somewhat – still fit better the latter theories. (He does not 
examine relationships with key suppliers, which retain elements of both 
economic and organizational theories.) Thus, his general perception tends more 
towards those of Dore and Jacoby. Albeit without addressing ideological 
underpinnings or implications, {Hasegawa 2005: 216-7} adopts a similar view. 
He concludes that the 1990s led only to “redefined internal” employee 
corporate governance, rationalizing board membership in a lower growth era, 
rather than “external” governance (involving more market-oriented 
mechanisms, for the benefit primarily of shareholders). More generally, drawing 
on studies from social psychology research into trust-based behaviour, see eg 
{Blair and Stout 2001} and related studies by them and others, reviewed in {Du 
Plessis et al 2005: 374-81}. 
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companies still make strategic and symbolic 
investments in one another and favor long-term, high-
trust partnerships over short-term arm’s-length ties”. 
More specifically, {Ahmadjian and Robbins 2005} find that rising 
foreign ownership of listed Japanese companies over 1991-2000 led 
to significant downsizing even of permanent employees as well as 
asset divestitures, associated with a shift towards shareholder-
oriented corporate governance. However, the effects were less in 
firms more deeply embedded in the Japanese stakeholder system, 
namely with high levels of ownership by domestic financial 
institutions or close ties with other firms. {Ahmadjian and 
Robbins 2005: 467-8} then speculate that “restructuring among 
foreign-owned firms may remove the perceived illegitimacy of 
these practices and encourage their spread to larger, older and 
more prestigious firms”, while conceding the alternative 
possibility of banks and business groups continuing “to check 
foreign influence, leading to an increased bifurcation between 
firms exposed to foreign capital that adopt Anglo-American 
practices and those that remain tied to the Japanese system and 
maintain business as usual”. Quite consistently, {Abe and 
Shimizutani 2005} find that the rising numbers of outside directors 
in Japanese firms are more inclined to implement layoffs and 
voluntary or early retirement, while insiders are more likely to 
decrease new hiring and protect incumbent employees. 
Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West, prolific commentators on 
corporate governance transformations in Japan, generally conclude 
that even more significant shifts are already underway in Japan. 
Most of their work, conveniently brought together in a recent 
collection of their essays {Milhaupt and West 2004}, has focused 
on how Japanese economic and political actors have reacted quite 
rationally and predictably to the evolving formal (legal) and 
informal (other institutional) “rules of the game”. Thus, derivative 
suits against directors by shareholders to safeguard their interests 
were prohibitively expensive and therefore almost unheard of, 
until the filing fee was dropped to a small set amount by reform to 
the Commercial Code in 1993 (originally {West 1994; 2001b}). The 
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regime also had to be reconfigured in an attempt to develop a new 
market for venture capital {Milhaupt 1997}. Such shifts towards 
more shareholder-focused corporate governance were necessitated 
by the breakdown in Japan’s “convoy” system of banking and 
finance, whereby financial institutions moved at the speed of the 
slowest member supported by the implicit guarantee of 
government bailouts, beginning with the housing mortgage 
debacle over the first half of the 1990s {Milhaupt and Miller 1997}; 
and crowned by the full-blown banking crisis of 1998 (see also 
{Milhaupt 1999}). Before such transformations, shareholders 
needed to turn to organized crime syndicates to partially secure 
their investments {West 1999; Milhaupt and West 2000}. Now, 
with new rules of the game leading also to a slowly growing 
market for Mergers & Acquisitions ({Milhaupt and West 2003a}; 
see also {Milhaupt 2005a}), even the new generation of Japan’s elite 
– graduates of Tokyo University Law Faculty – are forsaking long-
term careers in key ministries in favour of rapidly expanding and 
increasingly specialized Tokyo law firms ({Milhaupt and West 
2003b}). Overall, they suggest that these studies indicate a shift 
from more informal to more formal rules or institutions.  
However, this side of the equation – why and how the rules of the 
game change, thus influencing new patterns of observed behaviour 
– remains less closely examined. Although {Milhaupt and West 
2004} acknowledge their debt to this prominent political 
economist, this collection of their works does not pursue the 
conceptualisation of rules or institutions as “endogenous rules of 
the game” advanced by {Aoki 2001}. On that view, institutions 
both arise from the interaction and stable expectations of socio-
economic actors (being a dependent variable at time t), but also 
guide and constrain actor behaviour (becoming an independent 
variable at time t + 1) {Amyx 2004: 27}. Recent work by political 
economists comparing key components of Japanese corporate 
governance has also been sensitive to such feedback loops, even 
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though it further complicates especially the quantitative analysis 
of causal patterns in historical development.14 
Writing on his own {Milhaupt 2001} has emphasized the role of 
“norm entrepreneurs”, eg in breaking an (informal) taboo against 
hostile takeovers under the new (legal and social) rules of the 
games, and the activities of such actors have certainly attracted 
growing attention in more recent years.15 Yet he has only just 
started to look at drivers of these new rules, especially the more 
formal (legal) ones that have been more prominent than the 
informal ones, but which (on their book’s preliminary analysis) 
should tend to become more significant. For example, {Kanda and 
Milhaupt 2003} first point out that the director’s duty of loyalty 
transplanted into the Commercial Code (Art 254-3) from the US in 
1950 only became operational from the late 1980s. They then 
explain the initial stasis by the existence of partial substitutes (Art 
254(3)’s duty of care), but also a lack of “micro-fit” (few avenues 
for derivative suits until 1993, and judges and lawyers capable of 
applying broad principles rather than narrow rules16) and weak 
                                            
14 For example {Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 16 and 23} argue that “politics” 
such as electoral rules impact on “policies”, such as minority shareholder 
protections, which in turn result in shareholder diffusion (a key corporate 
governance “outcome”); but also that a “policy generates support for its 
continuance by eliminating its opponents and strengthening its beneficiaries 
and their commitment to the policy”, creating a feedback loop from outcomes 
back to politics. {Thelen 2004: 290-1} is even less deterministic, suggesting in 
particular that the German evolution of employment skills system since the 
late 19th century shows how institutional complementarities can develop not 
just through positive feedback, but by actors actively adapting inherited 
institutions to new circumstances, interests or power constellations. 
15 See {Milhaupt 2005a}; and also {Economist.Intelligence.Unit, 2005 #168}, full 
report at http://www.eiu.com/MA_Japan. 
16 The former seems more important than the latter, since Japanese legal 
practitioners have had few difficulties developing broad principles in other areas 
of law (such as “good faith” in contract law), and a relative aversion to bright-
line rules is consistent with the orientation of Japanese (and indeed US) law and 
legal institutions towards more substantive legal reasoning, at least compared to 
the English law tradition ({Nottage 2002}). 
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“macro-fit” (private substitutes, such as crime syndicates, and 
lifetime employment practices in a high growth economy). 
Presumably, such factors should work towards the enactment of 
new rules, not just the sudden operationalisation of dormant “law 
in books”. Instead, {Milhaupt 2003} indicates that a major 
determinant of corporate law changes over the last decade has 
been the growing power of Japan’s managers and their lobbyists, 
since so many are enabling rules providing extra flexibility (see 
also Appendix A17). Such provisions can be used for the benefit of 
shareholders and the company as a whole, but also to insulate 
managers themselves (as we now know so well in the aftermath of 
Enron and its parallels in Australia: {Clarke, 2003 #105}). 
That view means acknowledging also that the politics of corporate 
law reform may be very context-specific, which is one lesson I 
draw from his most recent work on the effects of the “elective” 
corporate governance reforms enacted in 2002. His main focus is 
on how and why a small but significant number of listed large 
companies have elected to replace the German-inspired regime of 
statutory auditors monitoring the board of directors, in turn 
potentially monitoring managers in the interests of shareholders 
(but also possibly other stakeholders), with a “US-style” regime of 
Committees of (mostly outside) directors charged with 
Nomination, Compensation and Audit of directors. {Gilson and 
Milhaupt 2005} find a variety of firms and reasons for adopting this 
new alternative, ranging from signaling “good governance” 
(especially if major firms with significant foreign ownership, like 
Sony18) to, conversely, using the narrow definition -- so far19 -- of 
“outside” director to plant parent or sibling company directors on 
                                            
17 This updates {Fujita 2004}, drawing also on {Takahashi and Shimizu 2005} and 
{Dernauer 2005}. On earlier legislation, see Tatsuta 2005} and especially {Baum 
and Takahashi 2005}. 
18 See also generally {Ahmadjian 2005}. 
19 Cf already the tighter definition, requiring in fact “independence” and thus 
excluding parent company directors, expected even by Japan’s Pension Fund 
Association: {Seki 2005}. 
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the new Committees in order to increase control of a corporate 
group (like Hitachi – with clear parallels with orthodox German, 
rather than Anglo-American, corporate practice). Interestingly, 
however, {Milhaupt 2005b} links this hybrid outcome to the lack 
of clear vision by policy-makers as to which of the two options 
was preferred, in turn due to a contest between the Ministry of 
Justice (MoJ) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The former 
initially proposed simply one, Committee-based corporate 
governance model; but the latter supposedly objected on behalf of 
the business community. Main reasons given by MoF were 
problems in securing requisite independent directors, and 
expecting them to operate in still highly relational networks. But 
another reason, reportedly, was the objection to imposing one 
corporate governance form on diverse organizations. Actually, this 
objection was echoed by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (METI: {Ahmadjian 2003}). Since the latter is even more 
closely linked to business sector lobby groups, the “success” in 
allowing two options in the 2002 Code amendments seems to 
reinforce the hypothesis of Milhaupt {2003} about their growing 
political clout in corporate law reforms. On the other hand, it is 
very intriguing – and a departure from the old ways of reforming 
corporate law until the 1990s – that so many new players are 
involved in this policy-making process. The MoJ (traditionally 
charged with commercial law reform) now competes with METI 
(responsible for broader industrial policy) and MoF (bolstered by its 
jurisdiction over stock exchanges, which in other countries set 
such “elective” standards – often more strongly: see eg {Collett 
and Hrasky 2005}). In the background, but surfacing sometimes in 
the reform councils (shingikai) or committees in each of the 
ministries, or promoting a growing number of law reforms through 
private members’ bills, we find the pro-business LDP 
Subcommittee on Commercial Law {Fujita 2004} and the 
Keidanren ({Vogel 2005: 160}; see generally also {Kitagawa & 
Nottage 2005}). The battles, moreover, are fought out in the 
context of much greater media interest in corporate affairs and 
policy reform. 
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In another recent study, into the evolving regulatory regime for 
hostile takeovers in Japan, {Milhaupt 2005a} highlights a new 
player in generating the new rules of the game: the courts. In 
Nippon Hoso KK v Livedoor KK (23 March 2005), the Tokyo High 
Court affirmed the trial court’s injunction preventing the target 
broadcaster issuing warrants to thwart a hostile takeover by an 
internet provider led by a flamboyant young businessman and 
“norm entrepreneur”, Takafumi Horie. The High Court clearly 
drew on the Delaware courts’ approach developed in the Unocal 
case, focusing on the threat of target shareholder exploitation and 
the proportionality of the response by the target’s management. A 
“Corporate Value Study Group” set up by METI in August 2004 
then rushed to complete “Guidelines for Hostile Takeover 
Defensive Measures (Corporate Value Protection Measures”, 
jointly issued with the MoJ in May 2005 based on the Study’s 
Group report that drew even more heavily on Delaware law. On 1 
June 2005, expressly referring to the Guidelines, the Tokyo 
District Court allowed a foreign institutional investor’s challenge 
to Japan’s first “poison pill”. The Delaware model has thus 
provided a compromise “global standard”, more shareholder-
oriented than the 2002 German Takeover Code implicitly rejected 
by the Study Group, but less so than the UK’s City Code requiring 
target firm boards to remain strictly neutral and obtain 
shareholder approval before installing defensive measures. Yet, 
rather than outright Americanisation of Japanese law, {Milhaupt 
2005a: 2210-1} suggests that “the High Court’s decision could be 
the foundation for development of a Unocal rule with Japanese 
characteristics – preventing egregious entrenchment attempts by 
incumbent management, but sanctioning airtight defenses to 
protect a range of corporate interests that appear very broad from a 
U.S. perspective”.  
Indeed, the outcome in the Livedoor case in 2004, and that in the 
District Court case in 2005, suggest that Japanese courts are quite 
finely attuned to the “gradual transformation” of Japanese 
corporate governance towards a more shareholder-oriented – yet 
still stakeholder – model. If that transformation proceeds fairly 
clearly, we may expect further decisions along these lines, perhaps 
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impacting back on legislative reform in this area or related fields of 
corporate law. Japanese courts have seen an upsurge in corporate 
law cases of many kinds since the 1990s (see eg {Takahashi and 
Sakamoto 2004}; {NichibenrenHomukenkyuZaidan ed 2004}), 
creating more scope for further iterations of judicial innovation 
and legislative reform, as witnessed for example in the field of 
product liability over the last decade.20 Broader comparative 
analogies could be made with new interactions between the two 
spheres in contemporary corporate governance in Australia 
{Corbett and Bottomley 2004}, and even more elaborate processes 
of “reflexive harmonisation” in member states of the European 
Union adjusting their domestic takeover regimes in the shadow of 
a Directive finally enacted in 2004 {Zumbansen 2004}. 
Overall, this new direction in Milhaupt’s work, starting to address 
why and how (especially formal) legal rules are created rather than 
just their impact on corporate behaviour, seems to go against 
recent work by West. He argues that Japan’s corporate law 
reforms, even since the 1990s, are driven by accelerating 
“exogenous” shocks such as scandals and (increasingly) foreign 
competition and economic downturn. {West 2001} contrasts this 
with “endogenous” change, led by rent-seeking actors (notably 
lawyers and other lobbyists in the US, with more scope for action 
given jurisdictional competition between Delaware and other 
states interested in attracting incorporations through corporate 
law reforms). In Japan recently, however, accounts by Milhaupt 
and others instead indicate growing “endogenous” competition – 
and perhaps even more broadly reasoned dialogue – among a 
growing array of state and even non-state actors.21 West’s more 
                                            
20 In its judgment in early 1994 in the “exploding TV” case, the Osaka District 
Court pushed the legislature towards adding that year a strict liability cause of 
action for defective products {Nottage 2004}, and that legislation in turn seems 
to have been taken as a cue to issue pro-plaintiff judgments particularly since 
the late 1990s {Nottage 2005}, amidst renewed widespread concern for product 
safety. 
21 It remains true that even Japan’s rapidly growing commercial law firms, 
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recent work with {Pistor et al 2003a; 2003b} may be more 
suggestive especially for the current and foreseeable rounds of 
corporate law reform in Japan. In particular, it does seem likely 
that the more enabling Japanese corporate law continues to 
become, the more legal innovation will take place, and the greater 
the need will become for institutional innovation, including new 
law enforcement agents. Even under that model, however, the 
hybrid development under the 2002 reform makes it more 
doubtful that Japan, as a (perhaps unusually developed) “legal 
transplant country”, will continue to reveal less innovative 
capacity as measured by the authors’ rate of legal change in 
corporate law and finance. 
(III) “THE GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION”: BEYOND 
CONTINUITY, IN JAPAN AND BEYOND 
How should we assess then these very different answers to the 
question of whether there has been significant change in Japan and 
its corporate governance system, namely: (i) No, because Japan 
remains (a) communitarian or instead (b) individualistic in basic 
orientation, or (ii) Yes, (a) to a very large extent or (b) to a 
considerably lesser extent. In particular, can we see already or 
expect soon the “Americanisation of Japanese law”, or at least 
important parts such as securities regulation, driven more broadly 
by economic liberalization, political fragmentation, and 
concomitant rise in the markets for legal services {Kelemen and 
Sibbitt 2002}? Readers should really be the judges, checking these 
commentators’ selections of topics, their sources and data, and 
other material, including if possible the much vaster literature in 
Japanese.  
                                                                                                                
{Nagashima and Zaloom 2002} and the new fully profit-sharing 
Japanese/international law firm partnerships, do not seem to be getting into this 
new policy-making game; but perhaps that remains a unique feature of US law 
and society anyway. 
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Nonetheless, the conclusion of myself and others that significant 
but not overwhelming change is underway in Japan – 
interpretation (ii)(a) – draws support from a broader recent study 
entitled “Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced 
Political Economies”. Drawing on empirical studies in Japan, 
Germany, France, Hungary, the UK and the US, the editors argue 
that “[1] equating instrumental with adaptive and reproductive 
minor change, and [2] major change with mostly exogenous 
disruption of continuity, makes excessively high demands on [3] 
‘real’ change to be recognised as such, and tends to reduce most or 
all observable changes to adjustment for the purpose of stability” 
{Streeck and Thelen 2005: 8}. They are impatient with theories of 
path dependence that tend either, as in work on “varieties of 
capitalism” {Hall and Soskice 2001} and welfare state 
retrenchment {Pierson 1994}, to imply [1] “reproduction by 
adaptation”, or – more rarely – [2] punctuated equilibria or 
“breakdown and replacement” {Pempel 1998: 3}. Streek and 
Thelen argue compellingly that theorists have not sufficiently 
recognised and conceptualized [3] “gradual transformation”, the 
now much more widely observed combination of incremental 
change resulting in discontinuity: 
Table 1 (adapted from {Streek and Thelen 2005: 9}) 
Result of Change   
Continuity Discontinuity 






Abrupt Survival and 
return 
[2] Breakdown and 
replacement 
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In my matrix of commentators on Japanese corporate governance, 
“continuity” advocates like Haley, Jacoby and Dore fall into 
category [1]. Strong proponents of change like The Economist fall 
into category [2]. Those in category [3], perceiving incremental 
change that nonetheless adds up to a significant transformation in 
Japanese corporate governance and society generally, include 
myself, Milhaupt and West, Vogel {2005}, and a growing majority 
of researchers.22 
In addition, all five modes for gradual but nonetheless 
transformative change, newly conceptualised by {Streeck and 
Thelen: 19-30} from their cross-national study of liberalising 
advanced political economies, resonate with shifts in Japan since 
the 1990s: 
(1) “Displacement”, as subordinate institutions (and 
related norms) slowly become more salient, can be 
seen in the fevered attempts by Ramseyer to prove 
that Japan maintained strong market-driven forms of 
socio-economic ordering even after World War II. 
Without accepting that these were the only forms, we 
can and should concede that some may have existed 
but were consciously or unconsciously downplayed. 
On the other hand, they still struggle to displace other 
forms of socio-economic ordering, evident in the 
“learning by monitoring” mechanisms still at work in 
some areas of the automobile industry ({Nottage and 
Wolff 2005}; see also {Ahmadjian 2005}).  
(2) “Layering”, whereby new elements are added onto 
existing institutions gradually change the status and 
structure of the latter, can be seen in many areas. A 
                                            
22 On broader changes in Japanese society, see another – aptly named – recent 
study: {Kingston 2004}. The term “gradual transformation” seems to be adapted 
from the earlier “Great Transformation” towards liberalized markets analysed 
by Karl {Polanyi 1944}, who pointed out also how their more destructive effects 
could be constrained even in modern society {Streeck and Thelen 2005: 4}. 
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clear example is the superimposition of the Product 
Liability Law of 1994 onto the venerable Civil Code 
{Nottage 2004}. Adding post-graduate “law school” 
programs from 2004, as part of a raft of reforms aimed 
at improving civil justice for firms as well as 
individual citizens, also hopes to have a trickle-down 
effect on undergraduate legal education.23 Other 
examples more closely related to corporate governance 
include Japan’s banks already differentiating more 
among corporate clients {Vogel 2005}, and the small 
but significant uptake already of the optional 
“Committee”-style board system analysed by {Gilson 
and Milhaupt 2005}.  
(3) An instance of “Drift”, neglecting institutional 
maintenance despite external change, may be the 
unwillingness – even compared to more liberalized 
Australia – to update the regulatory regime for 
securing the safety of general consumer goods {Nottage 
2005}.  
(4) {Vogel 2005} also reveals significant “Conversion” 
both through redeploying old institutions to new 
purposes (as METI adopts the mantle of more liberal 
reformers within government: {Elder 2003}), and 
through new purposes being attached to old structures 
(like venture capital being incubated within corporate 
group subsidiaries). 
(5) Finally the gradual attrition of core regular employees 
may be seen as “Exhaustion”, involving institutions 
gradually withering away over time.  
In short, Japan is largely following other complex industrialised 
democracies in “re-regulating” as it “de-regulates” {Nottage 
                                            
23 I concur with the assessment by {Haley 2005a} that this initiative is unlikely 
to have much short-term impact. However, even here I concede some bright 
side, and hope that this first round of reforms can be built on to generate more 
thorough-going “conservative reformism” {Nottage 2006b}. 
2006] NOTHING NEW IN THE (NORTH) EAST? 25 
 
2005b}, albeit probably with a different mix of the main modes for 
achieving such incremental but transformative change, and overall 
with less liberalisation than perhaps Germany and certainly 
France ({Goyer 2006}; but cf {O’Sullivan 2005}). 
 
II. FIVE WAYS FORWARD: PARTICULARLY, PROCESS 
PERTURBATIONS? 
Even more broadly, five caveats may be helpful in deciding 
whether this interim assessment is more persuasive than the other 
views categorised above. These points, drawing partly on similar 
issues arising in other comparative studies, may also be useful in 
carrying out or interpreting studies of corporate governance 
beyond Japan. Specifically, great care must be taken – and justified 
– in: (i) selecting timeframes, (ii) selecting countries to compare, 
(iii) balancing black-letter law and broader socio-economic 
context, (iv) reflecting on and disclosing normative preferences, 
and (v) giving weight to processes as well as outcomes, particularly 
when assessing change versus continuity. 
(I) TIMING 
First, history matters in many ways. Analyses often seem to be 
influenced by when they happen to be carried out or published, for 
example, influenced especially by the current economic 
performance of the analyst’s home jurisdiction and/or those 
compared, often linked to whether they are seen as having “good” 
governance or not {Aronson 2005}. In 2001, for example, after the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997 followed by unprecedented failure of 
banks and securities houses in Japan, and before the massive 
collapses of Enron and other firms in the US, there was a clearer 
tendency to see Japanese corporate governance as bad and US 
governance as good. This was the context, for example, for the 
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theory of strong convergence on the shareholder-driven model 
advanced by {Hansmann and Kraakman 2001}.24 By contrast, from 
2002 onwards, Enron and its aftermath led to skepticism about the 
benefits of the US approach, and hence more tendencies to 
perceive and acclaim ongoing divergences, in Japan and elsewhere. 
On the other hand, perhaps especially as new theories are deployed 
to explain rapidly evolving realties, several studies along such 
lines have drawn on rather outdated data.25 
Even if these challenges can be acknowledged and minimized, 
further problems arise in selecting time spans for comparisons. 
More objectively, for example, aspects of US corporate governance 
have themselves changed considerably after 2002. In particular, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has allowed federal securities regulators to 
go beyond (most market-oriented) disclosure requirements, and 
impinge on traditionally state-based corporate law by imposing 
obligations as to board composition and other matters internal to 
the corporation {Cioffi 2005}. Thus, Figure 1 above (extended from 
HR practices to corporate governance regimes more generally) 
should probably have looked rather different if the comparison had 
run only through to around 2000. The bell curve for the US would 
have been even further (right) towards the market end of the 
spectrum than “US 2004”, perhaps exacerbating a growing 
divergence between the US and Japan even as the latter also moves 
more slowly in that direction. Alternatively, more divergence may 
again have to be depicted in a few years from now, if {Du Plessis et 
al 2006} correctly predict a reaction against the Act’s more 
                                            
24 Such tendencies are related to express or implied normative preferences, 
discussed further in Part II(iv) below. 
25 Jacoby’s empirical research appears to date back to around 2001. That at least 
was the year in which he conducted his mail survey of listed Japanese and US 
firms. It is unclear when exactly the interviews of several companies in similar 
industry sectors in both countries were carried out. A similar temporal lag is 
found in {Learmount 2002: 41}, whose fieldwork on fourteen Japanese firms was 
principally “carried out in 1998-99, … with some follow-up visits in 2000”. 
Even more strikingly, interviews by {Hasegawa 2005} for his 8 case studies were 
conducted in September 1999. 
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interventionist approach as a result of finding that it did not 
prevent another likely round of corporate collapses  
Figure 1 would have looked even more very different if Jacoby 
{2005: 84-9} had compared Japan and the US between 1955 and 
1980, rather than 1980 and 2004, since even US firms were much 
more organization-oriented until the 1970s. As well as fewer 
differences in the distribution and means of firms in Japan and the 
US over that “Golden Age”, there would have been fewer shifts, 
supporting the “strong-path-dependence” hypothesis rather than 
the “weak-path-dependence” he tends to find between 1980 and 
2004. Even if he had focused instead on the 1980s, he might have 
found more evidence of “converging-divergences”, with an 
increasing variety of firms in both countries and even a shift of the 
means towards each other, as some firms in the US adopted or 
adapted some Japanese-style management techniques. Conversely, 
{Jacoby 2005: 19-20} would have found less support for the 
“national-model” hypothesis, namely only Japan moving – 
towards more market-oriented practices. 
Even if we focus on recent history, say 1980-2004, this may not 
necessarily predict where Japan or the US will head in the next 
few decades – or even in the turbulent political times likely to 
persist for the next few years in both countries, working their 
ways out of different but dangerous economic circumstances. As 
{Sacoby 2005: 163-73} concedes, both countries now stand at a 
crossroads, although Japan may be under more pressure yet its 
institutions less open to normative and political perturbations. 
Looking back eventually over a broader historical period, say from 
1980-2030, we may well find Japan to have converged somewhat 
on the US particularly over the late 1990s, only to diverge further 
after 2005 as relative economic performance picked up, even 
without any more shifts of the US towards market-oriented 
solutions. Thus, we would have to acknowledge considerable 
change, but not necessarily consistent convergence (see also 
generally {Du Plessis 2004}). 
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On the other hand, extending the historical frame of reference has 
encouraged bolder commentators to detect and advocate broader 
world-wide convergence towards shareholder primacy in corporate 
governance {Hansmann and Kraakman 2001} or, more generally, a 
modern liberal “horizontal society” {Friedman 1999}. Even {Hall 
and Soskice 2001}, proponents of “varieties of capitalism” theory 
that otherwise generally predicts ongoing divergences, have 
conceded that more “coordinated market economies” like Japan 
and Germany remain at risk of a one-way slide towards Anglo-
American “liberal market economies” if and when trust 
relationships unravel. However, as mentioned above (Part I (iii)), 
outright displacement does not seem to be so straightforward. 
More generally, {Tanase forthcoming} contends that the more we 
push for modern liberal law and society, the greater the resistance 
encountered as inherent contradictions emerge and community 
reasserts itself. Yet this begs the question of when such reactions 
will begin to set in, which may not be until a country like Japan 
has moved towards highly liberalized markets and a considerable 
dose of US-style “adversarial legalism” (cf {Kagan 2001}), judging 
by the gradual transformations already found in Japan and other 
advanced political economies. Thus, even if change does not occur 
uniformly, we may need to acknowledge more potential for 
convergence as we expand the temporal frame of reference for our 
analysis. 
(II) COUNTRIES TO COMPARE 
Secondly, especially when discussing convergence, we should be 
careful about our points of comparison. In particular, it is 
generally risky or less productive just to select two, such as Japan 
and the US, as this can lead to “an undue emphasis on differences” 
{Aronson 2005: 43}. This is a broader problem in all comparative 
law research. Adding a third jurisdiction, such as England for 
analyses of contract law, can uncover some important similarities 
between the two others, compared to this new reference point 
{Nottage 2002; 2004}. Adding Germany, common in the 
comparative corporate governance debate given its post-War 
economic performance followed by the current malaise, instead 
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suggests US exceptionalism. But most commentators see 
somewhat more of a shift towards the US model, driven partly by 
the economic imperatives of EU market liberalization. Germany is 
certainly not becoming the US {Cioffi 2005} and, as just 
mentioned, some ruptures have appeared in the US model itself 
particularly after the Enron debacle securities. Nonetheless, if we 
were to add Germany to the spectrum in Figure 1, we would 
probably have to interpose similarly shaped bell curves between 
the pairs for Japan and the US; and with, moreover, Germany’s 
mean shift for 1980-2004 being greater than Japan’s (“x” in Figure 
1). That would mean “directional convergence” {Jacoby 2005: 12} 
for both Japan and Germany, towards the US model; but less 
“pull” on Japan (for example under the “national-model” 
hypothesis, if the US doesn’t move), and/or stronger path 
dependence (even if it does). This would be an interesting result 
because we might fairly say that Japan is converging less, for 
example, but also because it may suggest that Germany may 
become a (hybridized) “national-model” competing with the US. 
The temptation then is to further increase the countries compared. 
This has been characteristic of the “second generation” of 
comparative corporate governance scholarship, especially by those 
favouring economic analysis, after a first generation that simply 
investigated key areas of US concern (such as board composition) 
in individual countries {Denis and McConnell 2005}. Much 
broader cross-national research into corporate governance is also 
becoming popular among political scientists (eg {Gourevitch and 
Shinn 2005}). As explained in Part II(v) below, however, there is 
certainly a risk in all such studies of producing “very broad and 
somewhat superficial conclusions, for example on issues such as 
the protection of minority investors, without giving any 
consideration to the difficult process of adapting foreign law 
concepts and corporate governance institutions to fit into one’s 
own system” {Aronson 2005: 43}. 
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(III) BLACK-LETTER LAW (PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE) VS SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CONTEXT (CONTINUITIES) 
Thirdly, analysts and their audiences must be aware that in 
comparative legal studies there is a tendency to find quite 
extensive change and hence much (actual or potential) 
convergence when focusing on narrower (more formal) “black 
letter law”, especially statutory provisions and case law; but to 
find little change and instead divergence when looking at law in 
broader context {Ginsburg et al 2001; Nottage 2004}. There is no 
necessary correlation between these dyads, as shown indeed by the 
study by {West 2001} demonstrating how the statutory provisions 
added to the Japanese Commercial Code’s from Illinois law during 
the Occupation in 1950 have instead diverged from their source. 
Nonetheless, as comparative corporate governance research 
becomes ever broader in scope, encompassing other areas of (often 
still mandatory) business regulation (see eg {Winkler 2004}) or CSR 
{Nottage 2006a}, we need to guard against too readily concluding 
that regimes overall are – and will remain – fundamentally 
divergent and resistant to change. That may be true along some 
dimensions, but not along all. 
(IV) NORMATIVE PREFERENCES 
Fourthly, in trying to become more reflective about how and why 
we and others undertake comparative research like this, we need 
to be more honest about underlying normative influences 
impacting on our empirical observations. Comparative corporate 
governance, as a field, emerged only in the 1980s, just as 
culturalist approaches started to lose popularity to the economic 
analysis of law, initially in the US but more recently in Europe 
(and, to a lesser extent, Japan: {Kozuka 2005}). In reaction to the 
former’s often more avowed normative slant, as well as now well-
known problems of tautology and difficulties in “proof”, the 
economic analysis of corporate governance has tended to stress a 
purely empirical agenda. However, just as in other areas of 
economics, hidden normative agendas and the power of rhetoric 
are readily apparent (see eg {Ferraro, 2005 #172}). Thus, Mark 
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Ramseyer is not only saying that Japan has always had a 
competitive market economy and concomitant legal system, 
populated by narrowly rational economic actors. He is at least 
implying that it should have these features, and thus be 
thoroughly deregulated if there happen to be any anti-competitive 
remnants.26 
By contrast, despite some of his own protestations to the contrary, 
Haley {2005a} wants Japan to retain its perceived communitarian 
core and related broader stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance.27 Thus, he both perceives and acclaims instead a 
more conventional regulatory paradigm. The Editor of The 
Economist, by contrast, wants both to uncover and to complete 
the unraveling of those models, in favour of the liberal models of 
economic and social ordering persistently trumpeted by his 
journal.28 Lastly, authors like myself (and perhaps Milhaupt and 
West) like some (more or less longstanding) features of Japanese 
law and society – sometimes communitarian, sometimes radically 
individualist – and hope that Japan can recombine them in optimal 
ways to meet evolving social needs and expectations.29 This 
approach tends therefore towards a re-regulatory paradigm. All this 
is not to say that we should abandon the search for empirical 
groundings for our normative hunches, but only to be explicit 
                                            
26 See {Nottage 2005b}. This disguised normative agenda – wanting empirical 
studies to prove to show that markets always clear, but otherwise to deregulate 
to force them to do so – is also very much the approach of the (first-generation) 
Chicago school of (law and) economics: {Freedman and Nottage 2006}. 
27 Indeed, he wants more such elements in the US: see also {Haley 1999}. 
28 See already {Emmott 1991}; and, urging Japan to tow the hawkish American 
line nowadays even on foreign policy, {Emmott 2004}. 
29 I must concede that this normative inclination may be related to a 
fundamental aspect of my identity: being married to a woman from Kyoto. 
Unlike Haley, I find it hard to acclaim all aspects of Japanese culture as reflected 
in my wife’s behaviour and beliefs; but nor would I want to efface them or 
define them out of existence, as Ramseyer or Emmott seem to desire so 
fervently for Japan more generally. 
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about the latter and how they may frame our empirical inquiries 
and conclusions. 
(V) PROCESSES, NOT JUST OUTCOMES 
Finally, one particularly promising way to do this seems to move 
away from analyzing and predicting specific outcomes, and instead 
to focus on processes impacting on Japan’s evolving corporate 
governance regime. As well as making us rethink how we assess 
change versus continuity, concentrating on processes may 
encourage the application of a broader range of methodologies to 
answer new questions. Studies should involve qualitative research 
as well as quantitative methods – not just the regression analyses 
that became almost de rigueur in analyses of commercial 
regulation over the 1990s, despite grave problems in generating 
and accessing suitably fine-grained quantitative data sets in Japan 
{Brinton 2004}. Already, we see salutary signs of impatience with 
applications of econometrics alone precisely in the field of 
comparative corporate governance {West 2002a}, and hence 
experiments in combined methods for other socio-legal studies of 
Japan {West 2002b}.30  
In particular, {Gourevitch and Shinn 2005} develop an attractive 
theory amenable to both multi-country quantitative analysis, and 
case studies including countries like Japan.31 While 
                                            
30 See also eg {Upham 2005} (brilliantly pointing out the strengths and 
weaknesses of both Ramseyer’s quantitative approach to the vexed issue of 
whether and why Japanese judges are truly independent in politically charged 
cases, and Haley’s more historical and institutional approach); and {Horiuchi 
2005} (combining quantitative and qualitative studies to explain the quite 
unusual phenomenon of higher voter turnout in local rather than national 
elections in Japan). 
31 {Jacoby 2005} also combines both large-scale survey research with case studies 
of HR in firms in comparable sectors in Japan and the US; but is less interested 
in the process generating new corporate governance norms than in their effects 
on firms. {Learmount 2002: 40} favours a “process study”, but in the sense of a 
mainly qualitative study of how inputs like board composition flow through to 
2006] NOTHING NEW IN THE (NORTH) EAST? 33 
 
acknowledging problems still in determining causation and so on, 
their correlations among data sets and some limited regression 
analysis indicate the general usefulness of a model involving:  
(a) “politics” (an independent variable comprising “preferences” 
of different interest groups towards governance regimes, 
combined with political “institutions” such as constitutional 
frameworks and political parties generating majoritarian versus 
compromise approaches); leading to  
(b) “policies” (an intervening variable, reflected in “minority 
shareholder protections” or MSPs; and “degrees of 
coordination”, features of Liberal Market Economies vs 
Coordinated Market Economics {Hall and Soskice eds 2001}); 
which cause  
(c) “corporate governance” variations (the dependent variable, 
measured by the diffusion of shareholdings). 
Especially regarding (a), political preferences, they deduce three 
main categories of tensions and predict different corporate 
governance outcomes accordingly: 
 
                                                                                                                
output variables like corporate performance, as opposed to “speculation about 
how governance might or should operate, based on inferences from broad 
statistics interpreted through different theoretical frameworks”. ({Gaston 2003} 
criticizes the lack of quantitative analysis, although agreeing with Learmount’s 
holistic approach and the especially the need for political explanations for 
Japan’s slow change over the 1990s.) {Hasegawa 2005} also limits himself to a 
mostly qualitative analysis, based on short case studies involving interviews of 
four manufacturing and four non-manufacturing firms. {Amyx 2004} obtained a 
unique database of Ministry of Finance personnel records, but chose to develop 
detailed descriptions of the Ministry’s networking into the banking sector and 
other agencies, rather than rigorous quantitative tests {Grimes 2005: 395}. 
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Table 2 (adapted from {Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 23}) 





Pair A: “class conflict” 
Owners (O) + Managers 
(M) vs Workers (W) 
O + M Investor [Korea] Diffusion 
O + M vs W W Labour [Sweden] Blockholding 
Pair B: “sectoral” conflict 




O vs M + W O Oligarchy [Russia] Blockholding 
Pair C: property and voice 
O + W vs M O + W Transparency [Chile] Diffusion 
O + W vs M M Managerism [US, 
France] 
Diffusion 
Gourevitch and Shinn argue that these more fine-grained 
coalitions and tensions, compared for example to studies like {Roe 
2003} focusing mainly just on class conflict, better explain 
differences among countries and also their continuities or changes. 
The countries added in square brackets in the Table above are 
2006] NOTHING NEW IN THE (NORTH) EAST? 35 
 
some that they then provide an “analytic narrative” or more 
qualitative explanation for, probably necessary as the model grows 
in complexity to better fit messy realities. Thus, Germany is seen 
as an “corporatist compromise”, gradually unfolding towards a 
“transparency” coalition as workers (W) switch allegiance from 
managers (M) to owners (O) in an attempt to maintain 
employment in a stagnating economy. By contrast {Gourevitch 
and Shinn 2005: 167} conclude that: 
“Japan is a case of a resilient corporatist compromise, 
grounded in a post-World War II historic compromise 
between managers and workers that is sustained by 
consensual political institutions. Since World War II 
there have been no broad changes in preferences towards 
governance, and only marginal changes in political 
institutions (a partial modification of electoral rules in 
1996 [sic: 1994]). As predicted by the corporatist 
compromise model, Japanese MSPs remain relatively 
low, although concentration [of shareholdings] is also 
low. This low level of concentration also has historical 
roots, when Japan’s blockholding zaibatsu families were 
wiped out by the US Occupation.” 
One problem with their model as applied to Japan is the 
disjunction between supposedly quite diffuse shareholdings (more 
characteristic of US-style corporate governance), and nonetheless 
more coordinated policies and consensus-based politics. Even so, 
because quantitative analysis deals in aggregates, overall the 
model can survive such anomalies provided other countries “fit” 
better. Thus, especially if we are interested in one country like 
Japan, we need to look carefully at the more qualitative analysis. 
There, it is actually arguable that the levels of MSPs and LME 
indicators related to “policies”, as well as the complexities of 
“politics” especially over the 1990s, involve more US-style 
features than the authors concede. At the same time, shareholder 
diffusion has been generally seen as much lower than estimated by 
{Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 18-19}, as indeed they concede, even 
though stable and cross-shareholdings have unwound considerably 
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since the late 1990s {Okabe 2002}. Combined, these reassessments 
of corporate governance outcomes, policies and politics for Japan 
would actually bolster their overall model and conclusions across 
countries; but that also requires an acknowledgement of more 
change or convergence on the US, or perhaps a new transparency 
coalition as in Germany.32 Overall, therefore, their work is a very 
promising recent approach focusing particularly on processes 
generating the “rules of the game” in corporate governance, not – 
like Milhaupt and West, mostly, so far – on how those parameters 
then feed back to impact on corporate behaviour. 
In analyzing such processes, though, we may need to develop even 
more sophisticated models of contemporary politics and policy-
making. Recall the suggestion by {Gilson and Milhaupt 2005} that 
making Committee-style Boards optional rather than mandatory, 
and even then not going as far as the US nowadays in requiring for 
example a majority of truly independent directors overall (cf also 
{Toda and McCarty 2005}), was due to a compromise among 
Japan’s ministries and associated interest groups, which in turn 
helps to explain the dispersed effects. Such views find parallels 
with the “public choice” explanation for “legislative failure”, 
which hypothesizes that more tightly organized groups will tend 
to hijack the policy-making process in the pursuit of narrow self-
interest {Ramseyer 1995}. 
Generally, however, public choice theory has faced powerful 
criticism on empirical grounds, through studies demonstrating 
how more diffuse groups have managed to coalesce to become 
                                            
32 Regarding “policies”, {Nottage 2001} queries the ready characterization of 
Japan as a CME rather than a LME, as well as noting quite strong MSPs at least 
“on the books” in Japan. More elements of a LME also explain at least some of 
the results from the studies by Mark Ramseyer. Regarding “preferences”, 
{Gourevitch and Shinn 2005: 9} stress that a shift away from pay-as-you-go 
public-sector pension schemes as a “substantial driver of new coalitional 
possibilities”, and agree with {Dore 2000} that there have been few changes yet 
in this area in Japan. Yet they may have over-estimated this factor: their 
account also acknowledges few changes in this area in Germany as well. 
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effective actors in the political process, and other work showing 
how legislators (and their bureaucratic agents) are often motivated 
by broader concerns such as ideology and the desire for respect 
from their peers {Rubin 2005: 584-7}. Prior “special interests” 
theory, emphasizing social elites’ ability to dominate politics, is 
more convincing in allowing for the possibility of legislative 
success as well as failure. However, it ties such success to 
restricting political influence over policy-makers in favour of 
neutral and mostly bureaucratic expertise, and generally remains 
too narrow and deterministic in emphasizing the power of social 
groups and structures. “Pluralism” is more recent variant of this 
theory, although it sees legislative success – as well as failure – as 
resulting from a political process itself strongly influencing the 
formation of groups that struggle to dominate it. “Deliberative 
democracy” theory takes a step further this notion of politics as an 
independent social process generating its own dynamics and 
alliances, by suggesting that politics may also generate individual 
or group commitments (rather than just representing them), 
potentially achieving more legislative success by allowing 
commitments to be redefined through rational public debate. 
However, all four theories tend to assume a clear distinction 
between good public policy (and hence “legislative success” or 
failure) and the political process. {Rubin 2005} views this as 
increasingly untenable, descriptively and normatively, and 
suggests that we focus more directly on good or bad processes 
coupling both policy-making and politics. In particular, he agrees 
with empirical studies suggesting that bad processes can be 
associated with “conceptual failure” – generating legislation 
overly framed by pre-conceived ideas, derived for example from 
prior legal concepts (eg {Morag-Levine 2003}). Descriptively, and 
indeed normatively, this approach has its attractions for Japan – 
but so do theories of pluralism and, perhaps especially, 
deliberative democracy. Certainly, compared to special interests 
and public choice theories, they seem a more promising way 
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forward to understanding distinct shifts in Japan’s policy-making 
processes particularly since the late 1990s.33 
Even more generally, to further demonstrate the usefulness of 
moving away from an obsession with outcomes, even if these 
appear more measurable, consider Japan’s recent general election 
{Horiuchi et al 2005}. Some might conclude that politics hasn’t 
changed in Japan over the 1990s, due to the (hitherto quite 
conservative) LDP’s huge victory in the recent election, or at least 
the fact that Prime Minister Koizumi’s campaign agenda centred 
overwhelmingly on (arguably limited) reforms to the postal 
system.34 But others might see the glass to be half full (changing), 
rather than half empty (unchanged), or even to be almost full 
(radically changed). One way beyond this impasse is instead to 
focus on the process or events leading up to this election. Then it 
appears much clearer that Japanese politics has changed 
considerably. Novel elements include the dissolution of the lower 
House to go back directly to the citizenry on a key policy issue; 
the abandoning of anti-reform LDP politicians in favour of high-
profile outsider (“assassin”) candidates – including high-profile 
entrepreneur Takafumi Horie; and even the LDP’s candidates’ 
“cool biz” style of campaigning in open-necked shirts.35 {Mulgan 
2002} therefore seems to have been too quick to predict 
“Koizumi’s failed revolution”. Her more recent analysis of 
agricultural policy provides “a litmus test of political and policy 
change”, since it exemplifies traditional political economy centred 
on closely aligned LDP politicians, officials and farmers. After 
examining “changes to electoral, bureaucratic and policymaking 
                                            
33 See eg {Drysdale and Amyx eds 2003}, {Pharr and Schwartz eds 2003}, 
{Kingston 2004}, {Hook ed 2005}, and {Ohnesorge forthcoming}. 
34 Cf {Haley 2005a}, but also the Leader in The Economist (17 September 2005). 
The incipient dismantling of the postal savings system, incidentally, does 
largely gainsay the views of {Maclachlan 2004}. 
35 On the Horie saga, fleshing out {Milhaupt 2005}, see eg {, 2005 #5;, 2005 
#7;Hori, 2005 #13;Kojima, 2005 #16;Marquand, 2005 #10;Sanchanta, 2005 
#8;Sanchanta, 2005 #9;Suvendrini, 2005 #11}. 
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systems, and underlying demographic, political, social and 
economic trends”, {Mulgan 2005: 262} concludes that even 
“Japanese agricultural politics is in a state of transition as many of 
the features of the old model are eroding”, with some changes 
more conducive to policy innovation although other elements of 
the old politics have reasserted themselves. However, 
{McCormack 2005} seems to go too far the other way in describing 
the latest election as part of Koizumi’s plan for “the substitution 
of a Hayekian, neo-liberal, American way for the Keynesian doken 
kokka [“construction state”] redistributive, egalitarian way”, 
advanced since the 1970s when Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka 
wrested control of the government’s purse strings away from 
Ministry of Finance bureaucrats. Instead, these political outcomes 
again seem to represent another gradual transformation. Perhaps 
more importantly, and reinforcing this sense of important change, 
the Koizumi administration has initiated many broader 
“procedural changes in the policymaking process” {Machidori 
2005}. 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Ultimately, detailed and realistic analyses of corporate governance 
changes in Japan, which go to the heart of Japanese capitalism and 
socio-legal ordering more generally, must therefore go beyond how 
the rules of the game influence the players, and consider why and 
how the players redefine the rules. In other words, we must 
examine more closely “patterns of policy reform”, as well as 
“patterns of corporate adjustment” {Vogel 2005: 153-62}. We can 
draw also on a rich theoretical and empirical literature combining 
both quantitative and qualitative analysis to show how firms in 
Japan and elsewhere not only respond to regulatory environments, 
but also attempt to reshape them – without necessarily 
“capturing” them, as predicted by public choice theory 
({Gunningham et al 2003}; {Howard-Grenville 2005}). Studies along 
these lines, focusing on processes and more complex feedback 
loops, seem likely to demonstrate significant transformations in 
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Japanese corporate and public governance, and perhaps explain 
better the modes of change and considerable diversity of outcomes 
currently in Japan. Moves in this direction, moreover, will require 
more interdisciplinary approaches, with those favouring legal or 
economic explanations engaging more with political scientists and 
sociologists, paralleling new tendencies in broader studies of 
comparative capitalism {Coates 2005}. In ongoing theory-building, 
particularly in comparative corporate governance, further insights 
can be drawn from lessons from the discipline of comparative law 
more generally, as detailed in Part II. These include closer 
attention to timing and timeframes for comparisons, selection of 
countries, balancing black-letter law and broader socio-economic 
context, and reflecting on – and disclosing – normative 
preferences. 
A promising and relatively unexplored area to apply such insights 
is CSR, which has emerged as a major topic of debate in Japan 
along with narrower corporate governance issues and a loss of 
trust in the corporate sector following a series of corporate 
scandals since 2000 {Nottage 2006a}. However, analyses of CSR 
practices in Japanese firms are of varying reliability and quality. 
Again, care must be taken regarding the temporal timeframe 
selected {KeizaiDoyukai 2004}, and the countries compared 
{Welford 2004}. Because CSR is such a broad concept, seen to go 
beyond legal requirements, we may also expect conclusions 
viewing or acclaiming relatively slower change. Normative 
preferences – skepticism on the part of conservative economists 
{Economist2005}, approval on the part of communitarians {Dore 
2005} – also need to be kept in mind. Most importantly, however, 
the diversity of norm-setting actors in this evolving area – 
involving leading firms, business associations, the government, 
and an array of NGOs – promises to yield a rich resource further 
supporting the conclusion of “the gradual transformation” well 
underway in Japan. 
More immediately, these broader theoretical points imply first the 
necessity for those advocating more stakeholder-focused models of 
corporate governance to update their understanding of its evolving 
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variant in Japan. In doing so, and for even more practical purposes, 
it is crucial to bear in mind the typology of views outlined in Part 
I, as well as the emerging consensus that significant but complex 
changes continue to play themselves out in Japan. 
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Main Issues Remarks 
1993 
 Corporate governance (limiting 
the court filing fee for derivative 
actions) 
 Corporate governance 
(introduction of a board of auditors 
in a large company) 
 Corporate governance (relaxing 
the requirement for shareholders 
to exercise their right to inspect 




 Deregulation on stock repurchase 
(lifting the prohibition for 
purposes of an employee’s stock 




 Introduction of the stock option 
system 
 Deregulation of stock repurchases 
(lifting the prohibition for 
purposes of a stock option plan) 
 Deregulation of stock repurchases 
(simplifying the procedure by 
which public corporations can 
repurchase shares from the 
market, or by way of a tender offer 






 Corporate restructuring (merger 
procedures) Government-
sponsored Bill 
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1997(3) 
 Increasing penalty against the 





 Deregulation of stock purchases 
(expanding the available funds for 







 Corporate restructuring: 
introduction of Share-to-Share 




 Corporate restructuring: 
introduction of the “demerger” Government-
sponsored Bill 
2001(1) 
 Deregulation of stock repurchases 
(completely abolishing the 
prohibition, and lifting the ban on 
“treasury stock”) 
 Deregulation of the minimum size 
of shares 
 Simplifying the procedure relating 







 Authorising the electronic 
documentation of corporate 
information 
 Corporate finance (authorising the 
company to issue call options for 
its shares) 
 Simplifying the procedure for 
stock options 
 Corporate finance (deregulation of 








 Corporate governance (authorising 
the limitation of a director’s 
liability) 
 Corporate governance (improving 







 Corporate governance (creation of 
optional “Company with 
Committees” modelled on the 
American corporate governance 
system) 
 Corporate governance (creation of 
“Important Asset Committee”) 
 Corporate governance (relaxing 
the requirement for super majority 
voting at the shareholders’ 
meeting) 
 Corporate governance/corporate 
finance (introduction of class 
voting for the election of 
management) 
 Introduction of the registration 
system for lost securities 
 Simplifying the reduction 
procedure for legal capital and the 
mandatory statutory reserve fund 




 Deregulation of stock repurchases 
(simplified procedure for public 
corporations to repurchase shares 
from the market, or by way of a 







 Dematerialisation of corporate 
securities 
 Electronic public notice system 
Government-
sponsored Bill 
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2005 
 Consolidation of corporate 
legislation into new Companies 
Act, using modern Japanese 
language Abrogation of Yugen 
Gaisha (similar to GmbH in 
Germany), generally treated as 
Kabushiki Kaisha (AG or joint 
stock companies), and new Godo 
kaisha (limited liability 
companies, quite like LLC in the 
US) and yugen sekinin jigyo 
kumiai (limited liability 
partnerships, quite like LLP); but 
 KK divided into large and small 
companies either category of 
which can be established as 
closely or publically (with large 
and publically held companies 
requiring a more complex 
governance structure – including 
the option still of a board with 
committees; whereas closely held 
companies need not always treat 
all shareholders equally, statutory 
auditors can be limited to 
reviewing only financial 
statements and not business 
operations of directors, and all 
such officers can have terms 
extended for up to 10 years) 
 For KK, optional accounting 
consultant (as an officer to assist 
directors in preparing financial 
statements), only one director 
possible (instead of at least three), 
minimum capital requirement 
abolished, freedom to distribute 
profits whenever (not up to twice 
Government 
sponsored Bills 




 Tripartite mergers to allow the 
absorbing company in a merger to 
provide cash or other assets (eg 
parent company stocks) to 
shareholders rather than issuing 
shares from the newly merged 
company 
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